In this construction defect case, the plaintiff, owner of the Harriet Tubman Gardens Apartment Corporation, sued the sponsor, Bluestone Organization and the our client, York Restoration Corporation. York was a subcontractor retained by the general contractor to repair leaks in the façade of the building pursuant to the plans and specifications prepared by architect, Arthur Kahane Architect PC. Plaintiff alleged leaks continued after York completed its work. Our position was that York had no liability because it performed its work correctly and in accordance with Kahane’s plans as required by its subcontract. Plaintiff and Bluestone argued that a 2016 field investigation report by plaintiff’s expert raised issues of fact as to whether York’s work was defective. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision, which denied our motion, and  granted our motion, dismissing our client from the action. 

​Nothing in the report of plaintiff’s expert said York’s work was defective, or that York was in breach of its contract or Banta’s or Kahane’s specifications. The only criticism was the scope of the repairs and that caulk should not have been specified, both of which were Kahane’s responsibility. There was no conflicting expert report or opinion.
 
New York case law in every department holds that where a contractor is bound to follow plans and specifications provided by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for defects in the plans and specifications. Where, as here, an owner or its agents certified that a contractor’s work was completed according to the contract the contractor is entitled to summary judgment. We cited MG Hotel, Gray v. RL Best and numerous other cases.
 
In sum, we argued, and the Court agreed, that York met its burden of establishing that it performed its contractual obligations without exception and Plaintiff’s own expert did not fault York’s work. York established and it was undisputed, that York had no independent obligations other than to do what Kahane told it to do and do it to Kahane’s satisfaction and obtain Kahane’s approval.
 

Fern Flomenhaft won a defense verdict in a slip anD fall case following a 3 week trial in Supreme Court, New York County, before Judge Lyle Frank. The plaintiff, a 50 year old woman, sustained a comminuted patella fracture which was surgically repaired in a fall on the ADA Pedestrian plate at the corner curb cut of our client's building. Although  she alleged she fell due to water that she alleged came from a condensation tube installed by our client's mercantile tenant, the plaintiff was not able to establish that water from the tube was emitted on the day of accident or that water on the ADA Pedestrian plate on the corner came from the tube. 

The co-defendant mercantile tenant, represented by Steven Cohen, Esq., also prevailed at trial. 

Plaintiff was represented by Jeffrey Schulman, Esq. of  Liner LLP.

Plaintiff alleged that on July 10, 2013 he injured his right hand and left knee while performing construction work at the home of the defendant Buckwalter. Buckwalter contracted with third-party defendant WM Dorvillier to demolish an existing structure (staircase) at the rear garden level of her building and to construct and install an open porch for residential use. Plaintiff, a construction/demolition worker for Dorvillier alleged he was injured by an angle grinder that was missing a guard.
 
Plaintiff alleged violations of NY Labor Law§§ 200 and 241(6). As §241(6) requires a plaintiff to establish a violation of the industrial code, plaintiff also alleged violations of 12 NYCRR §§ 21-1.10(b), 23-1.5(c)(3), 23-1.12(a), (c)(1)(2) and 23-9.2(a)(d).
 
We argued that Buckwalter was not liable to the plaintiff under Labor Law § 200 because she did not supervise or control the work and she was not on notice of the  defective angle grinder. In addition, we argued the premises are exempt from liability under the homeowners’ exemption to Labor Law § 241.
 
The Court, citing Vera v. Low Income Marketing Corp., 145 AD3d 509 [1st Dept. 2016], granted summary judgment, since Buckwalter merely contracted for the work, was not home at the time of the accident and there was no evidence that she created the condition that caused the accident.
 
We also argued, citing Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362 [1996], that despite the ground floor doctors’ office at the premises, Buckwalter was protected from liability under the homeowner’s exemption of Labor Law § 241(6) because the premises was a two-family dwelling and the porch in question was constructed at the back of the house outside Buckwalter’s parlor, as an extension of her unit.
 
The Court held that plaintiff’s submissions of an endorsement page and deed dated 9/23/16 (post-accident) and undated Streeteasy.com listings were not dispositive to show that the premises was a three-family dwelling. Rather, the deed in effect at the time of the accident, the certificate of occupancy and HPD search report, as well as the testimony as to the layout and occupancy of the premises, were controlling to show the premises was a two-family dwelling. 
 
Furthermore, the exemption is available even where the premises is jointly used for residential and commercial purposes. The premises had two residential apartments – one single-floor unit jointly occupied by one family and one two-floor unit occupied by Buckwalter, which shared a common entrance. 

We also moved for summary judgment against WM Dorvillier, and argued that it is obligated to indemnify and hold Buckwalter harmless and to cover her defense costs and expenses. We argued that according to her contract with WM Dorvillier to construct a porch at her residence, WM Dorvillier’s was obligated to supervise and control the work, to named Buckwalter as an additional insured on Dorvillier’s insurance policies and fully indemnify and hold her harmless.
 
Over the opposition of both the plaintiff and Dorvillier, Judge Gonzalez granted summary dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint and awarded Buckwalter all costs and expenses from Dorvillier, which Dorvillier’s insurer was obligated to pay.

FF PLLC won in the Southern District of New York, with a very favorable decision in by U.S. District Judge Loretta A. Preska denying Petitioner American Home’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an allegedly binding Payment Agreement between American Home and another party and granting our motion to dismiss and transfer to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.
 
Judge Preska, in a terse 11-page decision, laid out the facts objectively, without comment as to the underlying merits (who is bound by the Payment Agreement). She proceeded to recite the legal standards, fully agreeing with our arguments. She concluded that the date of the first-filed case – the case filed by our client Peccole-Nevada (PNC) in Nevada state court – is the date to be used to determine which forum will hear the case, including whether any exception applies. The state court filing governs even when that claim is removed to federal court, and even for a consolidated case.
 
The Court rejected Petitioner’s reliance on the subject Payment Agreement’s forum selection clause.
 
The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that “this case is a bit unusual in that, among the competing actions [there were 5], each has a first-filed case.” In her most quotable line, she stated: “While this may be possible in Lake Wobegon, where all the children are above average, here in the Southern District of New York, there can be only one first.”
 
Judge Preska then addressed Petitioner’s “five arguments against this straightforward analysis,” and rejected each of them one by one.
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First, the Court rejected Am. Home’s argument that it filed suit before all but the PNC parties and therefore the date of consolidation should govern.
 
Second, the Court rejected Am. Home’s argument that the venue/forum selection clause in the Payment Agreement governs.
 
Third, the Court rejected Am. Home’s argument that PNC’s filing in New York state court “signaled that they believe New York is an appropriate venue/forum.” The Court specifically stated: “As Respondents note, their filing in New York was ‘to file a defensive Petition asserting a limited appearance to contest personal jurisdiction and preserve the right to stay arbitration.’”
 
Fourth, the Court rejected Am. Home’s argument that the Nevada District Court may not have jurisdiction over all the parties.
 
And fifth, the Court rejected Am. Home’s argument that the Nevada actions are “anticipatory suits” that are not entitled to any first-to-file weight, stating that “[t]his is not an accurate characterization of the first-filed Nevada action.” In rejecting this argument the Court distinguished National Union v. Las Vegas Prof’l Football Ltd, P’ship, since, in that case it was “undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate some claims.” The Court added (in a comment that suggested a favorable view of the merits): “Here, Respondents contest whether the arbitration clause applies to them at all. This is at least a plausible claim and not simply a pretense to avoid this Court’s jurisdiction.”
 
The Court also added: “Petitioner has not shown that the suit was filed ‘in response to a direct threat of litigation that gives specific warnings as to deadlines and subsequent legal action’.” The Court’s rejection of the “anticipatory suit” exception to the first-file rule, at the very least, would have been helpful if American Home were to attempts to make the same “anticipatory suit” argument in Nevada District Court.